1 'The kid most likely': Naming, brutality and silence within and beyond school settings Violence in educational settings is a complex issue, and the topic of a considerable body of international research literature (see, for example, Casella, 2001; Elliott, Hamburg, & Williams, 1998; Mills, 2001 ). This volume of research asks authors and readers to rethink what is known and believed about school violence, and in this chapter I draw on three narratives in order to query the brutality of discourses within which children are labelled and silenced. The chapter is concerned with systemic violence (Watkinson & Epp, 1997) and its discursive effects, calling into question: labelling practices that name children as particular 'types' of social subject; silencing practices that denigrate, disregard and dismiss those most vulnerable in unequal relations of power; as well as those discursive silences that tacitly enable the reproduction of violence. Through the figure of 'the kid most likely'-in other words, children who are constituted as those most likely to experience educational failure, to commit criminal offences, to pose risks to themselves and others-the chapter considers how discursive practices of naming and silence powerfully reproduce and normalise symbolic and material violence within unequal relations of power.
In a collection of essays originally published in 1974, Michel de Certeau points out how violence is inscribed in technical procedures and scientific knowledges aimed at eliminating and appropriating other existences in the project of producing discursive and cultural 'unities'. He calls our attention to 'what ceases to speak and to be spoken' through the practices of othering, of colonizing, of categorising, and of naming. In educational settings, such practices occur in myriad ways. At times they may take the form of overt instances of discrimination, harassment, vilification, exclusion and violence. Yet they are also woven throughout many everyday assumptions, taken-forgranted approaches and accepted wisdom seen in normative discourse as necessary and appropriate for contemporary educational practice. For Certeau, the discursive effects of practices that marginalise, silence and exclude call into question the foundational claims from whence such practices derive their rationales. He writes, "All the progress of our knowledge can be measured by the silence that it creates" (Certeau, 1997, p. 139) . I undertake this discussion, then, in the current context of national and global politics-in which young people are increasingly subjected to heightened levels of suspicion and surveillance, ideological manipulation through policy manoeuvres such as 'values education' and 'national curriculum', and marginalisation and oppression through the dehumanising agendas of neoliberal rationalities of governance. Certeau's insight pertaining to the violence of such endeavours informs my own approach to researching and theorising the ways in which social institutions operationalise and reinscribe the cultural production of violence. In this chapter, I want to argue that practices of naming and silence operate together to effect violent norms and social relations that all too often go unmarked in those official discourses that most powerfully impact on the lives of young people.
Who then, is 'the kid most likely'? Do we know him? (For decades of statistics on educational underachievement, learning and behavioural disorders, schoolyard bullying, and violent crime insistently remind us-through the kinds of questions that they ask and 'answers' they construct-that the 'the kid most likely' is almost certainly male.) Do we recognise him? (For visual culture provides us with innumerable images through which he is popularly constructed-in the US, for example 'the kid most likely' has for decades been depicted as the product of Black and Hispanic communities living in urban poverty, and in Australia he has been depicted as the child of Indigenous, migrant and single parent families, although in recent times he has morphed globally into the jihadist terrorist 'of Middle Eastern appearance'.) A genealogical tracing of the discursive emergence of those young people who are categorised as most likely to be 'at risk' and to pose a risk to themselves, to others, and to the moral, economic and social order more broadly is beyond the scope of this chapter. It is worth noting, however, that such tracings are the subject of a considerable literature concerned with highlighting their discursive effects on the lived experience of young people. As Susanne Davies points out, while philosophies associated with eugenics and social Darwinism may no longer be openly espoused as providing explanations for human character, behaviour and worth, their long discursive history has left indelible marks on everyday thought and practice within social institutions, playing "an important role in rendering those least well-positioned in society vulnerable to professional and state intervention, abuse and exploitation" (Davies, 2005, p. 13) . Indeed discourses of youth 'at risk' play an important role in naturalising notions of essential dispositions and qualities, of centres and margins, that powerfully shape the lived experience of those least powerful. As Linda Graham and Roger Slee observe: Naturalisation effaces. In naturalising a particular mode of existence, we construct a universalised space free from interrogation, a ghostly centre which eludes critical analysis and thus recognition of the power relations embodied within notions of normalcy which exert influence over other ways of being (Nakayama & Krizek, 1995) . When we identify categories of children, whether we refer to children at risk or children with a disability or children whose first language is not English, we not only make difference visible but work to maintain power imbalances and structural inequity by reifying unnamed attributes that carry social, political and cultural currency (Graham & Slee, 2005, p. 16 ).
The point I want to make here, then, is that 'the kid most likely', while a heterogenous construction with a multiplicity of formulations, is nonetheless insidiously inscribed on the bodies and lives of numerous children and young people upon whom the consequences and effects of brutalities and biases against 'the kid most likely' are continually brought to bear.
It is these brutalities and biases that provide the provocation for this chapter, and in the sections that follow I share three very different stories that together raise powerful questions about the complicity of pedagogic knowledges, professional practices and policy contexts in the cultural production of violence against 'the kid most likely'. My analysis is informed by Certeau's suggestion that "If, by violence, we mean a growing distortion between what a discourse says and what a society does with it, then this very discourse functions as a manifestation of violence. It becomes itself a language of violence" (Certeau, 1997, p. 30 ). Certeau's is a critique of hypocrisy, of the violence that is produced in those disjunctions between what is said, known, accepted, believed, allowed to pass without censure or comment and what is actually done. In the context of the following examples, then, the questions I want to raise pertain to how certain practices of naming and silence illuminate those disjunctions, and raise questions about how violence is produced and maintained as a cultural formation in which we are all complicit, and of which we are all victims.
The worry
Jonathan Talbot 1 is a worry. "He looks so innocent," one of his teachers remarks, "but he's a real worry." (Field Notes, Westland Preschool, 2006 an 'expert' discourse" within which "a whole raft of professionals…have come to operate a quasi-psychological ethics" (Rose, 1999, p. 264) -the children at Westland
Preschool demonstrate their own recognition of behavioural discourses, categorising
Jonathan's behaviour in ways that document his transgressions and constitute him as a particular type of undesirable social subject. They routinely initiate conversations with me using Jonathan as a starting point: one or more children actively incite a negative response from Jonathan by hitting or shoving him, snatching a toy away from him, or excluding him from play; when he lashes out, the screams of those who have provoked the retaliation are heard by teaching staff, who intervene immediately and carry Jonathan kicking and screaming from the offending scene; he is then scolded loudly and placed on a chair to sit alone; the wounded party is consoled and then accompanied and supported in confronting him with the declarative, "I don't like it when you do that, Jonathan." The volume and veracity with which the injured child is explicitly instructed to repeat "I don't like it" is often proportional to tears of the injured child. The teachers' reading of Jonathan's offence and its severity is such that raised voices and clenched teeth figure routinely in these instances of 'assertiveness training' and 'conflict resolution' into which the other children are being inducted.
Such scenes are played out numerous times each day, as Jonathan's general visibility as the performative playground bully is compounded by his "compulsory visibility" (Foucault, 1977, p. 187) as the naughty child who is repeatedly publicly reprimanded, isolated and humiliated by teachers and students alike. I am not intending to imply wilful abuse or dereliction of the teachers' duty of care, and am indeed mindful of the complexities they face in managing a complex social environment. I also acknowledge their attempts to reason with and attend to the needs of a demanding and difficult child, and recognise the necessity of preventing injurious behaviour in educational contexts where there is a duty of care to ensure children's safety and wellbeing. However, the circumstances within which Jonathan's story takes place provide a powerful example of the kinds of tacit injustices that make institutions complicit in the cultural production of violence.
There is an unjust brutality, for example, in the persistent naming of Jonathan and his behaviour as aberrant, while the complicity of others is masked by their tearful performances as innocent victims. Institutional complicity is underscored by explicit pedagogic techniques that effectively invest the other children's unnamed transgressions with institutional authority, giving rise to a disciplinary system that "enjoys a kind of judicial privilege with its own laws, its specific offences, its particular forms of judgement" (Foucault, 1977, pp. 177-178) . In this disciplinary system, Jonathan's legitimacy as a learner with the potential to recognise the feelings of others, to improve on his behaviour, and to develop more meaningful forms of social interaction is effectively revoked by essentialising discourses that cast his behaviour as biologically fixed and determined. Even on those occasions when Jonathan can be seen playing peacefully with other children-sharing, taking turns, cooperating-his behaviour is unable to be understood or recognised within the terms of social learning, of empathy for others, or of developing greater self-control. Instead, even desired behaviours are silenced, stripped of legitimacy and attributed to interventions made possible through medical knowledges, rather than to the kind of agentive capacity that is routinely attributed to the other children. Jonathan's naming as a pathologised social subject thus contributes to his silencing as a learning subject.
Importantly to the purposes of this chapter, the dialogic relation between naming and silence is a crucial dimension of the imposition of disciplinary judgement upon the 'kid most likely', and I share the following example as a way of exploring its potency.
On a recent noisy and chaotic morning at the preschool, the children engage enthusiastically in a period of 'free play'-some are dressing up in the home corner, clanking around the room in glittering high heels, arguing over dollies and their paraphernalia; a group of boys plays, as they regularly do, a game involving plastic dinosaurs and doll houses, staging hostile takeovers of the doll house chairs and its plastic television. They conduct fierce and noisy battles between the dinosaurs, who loudly devour one another in order to gain control of the imaginary " 'mote control". Other children play with wooden puzzles and blocks that have been laid out on tables, and several boys chase each other around the room imitating the raucous noise of the Bathurst races they have watched on television at the weekend.
Jonathan sits on the floor with a group of children who are playing with a bowl of plastic fruit and ice cream cones, while a teacher sits nearby monitoring their play. One of the other children takes over the bowl of plastic food and refuses to let the others continue to play with it. The teacher tries to gently cajole her into sharing with the other children, and Jonathan tries, unsuccessfully, to grab a piece of the plastic food, and a struggle over the bowl ensues. The teacher intervenes, picking up a now kicking and screaming Jonathan and placing him on a chair at the opposite side of the noisy room. The general clamour that has filled the room up until this point is powerfully disrupted when Jonathan's foot randomly connects with a wooden screen that lands with a thunderous crash on the hard linoleum tiles on the floor. There is an immediate hush of surprised, complete, awful silence-every child freezes, every teacher halts, and every eye in the room is drawn first to the site of the toppled screen and then to the small child responsible for the mighty sound. For several seconds no one moves or speaks as all stare silently at Jonathan, who nervously wiggles his leg, glancing back at them in turn. Eventually one of the teachers takes a step forward and says loudly and harshly, with an unmistakeable tone of disgust, "Jonathan Talbot!" For several more seconds all stare silently, before first some and then others return to their play with now lowered voices. (Field Notes, Westland Preschool, 2006) I want to map my reading of this scene onto those prior discursive moments-those of bullying, injury, exclusion, domination, pathologising, and naming to which Jonathan is routinely subjected-in order to suggest that the violence of these normative practices is insidiously woven into the space of silence brought about by the crashing wooden screen on the preschool floor. This is no neutral silence, but rather it is a silence that interrogates, insinuates, articulates prior events and anticipates others yet to come.
The teacher's angry and disapproving declaration of Jonathan's name speaks a past, present, and future marked by transgressions for which he will be held fully accountable-not the contributing factors occasioned by others, not the policies and pedagogies of the educational institution, not the 'psy' inspired discourses that "make it possible for each individual to relate to themselves and the course of their life in particular ways" (Rose, 1999, p. 270) . Indeed, even as it reproduces the violence of prior events, the moment of discursive silence marks the complicity of social knowledges and practices which precede and exceed the individual. Nowhere, except in the silence of glances, a child's awkward squirming on a chair, the glare of an angry teacher, and of a room full of people with nothing to say, is that complicity marked.
In the judgement silence pronounces on the complicity of others, of institutions, of accepted knowledges and pedagogic practices, there is of course a productive possibility-a moment in which the question of how things might be done and thought otherwise is made possible. Yet the authoritative, angry and punitive speaking of a single name seemingly forecloses the potential gain, replacing the discursive query with a decisive answer that effects that most damaging of all violences- 
The degenerate
He is visible and vocal, openly commanding attention through the brusk physicality of his presence in classrooms, sporting groups and playgrounds. He routinely struts across the schoolyard, making comments about students he dislikes and voicing his opinion at every opportunity. As a PE teacher at Plains High School, there is no shortage of opportunities for Mr. Pratt to exert influence on those around him.
Elsewhere (Saltmarsh & Youdell, 2004) , Deborah Youdell and I have written about our ethnographic research at Plains High School, with particular reference to the ways in which Mr. Pratt's narratives, attitudes and behaviours toward some individuals and groups in this western Sydney high school functions to constitute "marginalized student identities and disempowered subject positions" (Saltmarsh & Youdell, 2004, p. 10), reproducing practices of educational triage that effectively ration students' educational opportunities (Gillborn & Youdell, 2000) . In our earlier work from the Plains High study, we note how Mr. Pratt's derogatory comments are instrumental in marginalizing a sport class whose students are seen as failing to satisfactorily negotiate the masculinist discourses valourised within the school. We also note how other teachers remain silent during Mr. Pratt's denigration of students, and we argue that:
…the unquestioned acceptance of negative constitutions of the students by staff has a normative function, serving both to normalize the practices of assigning students to marginalized discursive positions, as well as to normalize and reinforce the predominance of teachers' views within the discursive hierarchy (Saltmarsh & Youdell, 2004, p. 9) Here I want to follow on from that work, bringing to bear once again Certeau's contention, cited at the beginning of this chapter, that "All the progress of our knowledge can be measured by the silence that it creates" (Certeau, 1997, p. 139 charge against the student lies not just in the immediacy of the accusation, but also in its potency within broader discourses of social legitimacy. Indeed, according to Nikolas Rose:
"The limits of the permissible appear to be fixed only by two characteristics of our contemporary regime of freedom. There is conduct that is non-consensual, that is to say, where the freedom of another is violated: the epitome is the image of the paedophile. And there is conduct that is excessive, that manifests a lack of the exercise of will and free choice, whose epitome is the alcoholic or the heroin addict but which extends, as well, to the pathologies of 'liberation' exemplified by 'excesses' of the gay sex scene in the era before AIDS" (Rose, 1999, p. 266) By constituting this student as the kid 'most likely to become a paedophile', and as one who poses a particular risk to younger boys, Mr. Pratt demonstrates the skill with which he is able to manipulate discourses of both violation and excess to establish his own position of absolute entitlement within an institution of power. His homophobic and misogynist derision directed at colleagues in the staff room is masterfully redeployed against a far less powerful target, in a public demonstration of the extent to which "normal defines and oppresses what it designates as abnormal" (Dyer, 1997, p. 264) . In this scene, where the speaking of violence is accompanied by the complicity of silence, Alan is simultaneously positioned as degenerate threat and as victim "upon whom the theatre of identifying power is performed" (Certeau, 1986, p. 41).
While I am not intending to imply that such abuses of power are always so readily evident in other schools and other places, I am suggesting that incidents such as these establish the limits of pedagogic theories and educational policies to effect social change within the epistemological terms that they have established. These limits are established precisely because they articulate the complicity of institutionally sanctioned hierarchies (between students and staff, and between staff differentially located by gender, race, sexuality and other identity categories), of professional behaviours (in which, for example, colleagues do not openly criticise other members of staff in the presence of students), and of powerful discourses of homophobia, racism, misogyny and heterosexism around which naming and silence are choreographed.
The Lost
His death was the subject of five separate inquiries, and there will be no more chances There are two crucial aspects of this story that I want to raise here as matters of critical concern with relation to naming and violence. The first of these is the complicity of neoliberal reform agendas in developed nations that have persistently subjected the provision of public services to market models. The corporate ethos adopted in the delivery of public services diminishes the needs of those most vulnerable to costs that must be managed efficiently in order to deliver the greatest fiscal returns to the corporate sector and shareholders, and budget surpluses to There is no law that is not inscribed on bodies…From birth to mourning after death, law 'takes hold of' bodies in order to make them its text. Through all sorts of initiations (in rituals, at school, etc.), it transforms them into tables of the law, into living tableaux of rules and customs, into actors in the drama organised by a social order (Certeau, 2002, p. 139) .
The materiality of law in this case powerfully inscribes the internal logics of neoliberal policy and its language of efficiency and profitability on the body of the prisoner-child who becomes the ledger upon which its substantive costs are tallied. 
Reflection
In each of these three stories, discursive practices of naming and silence have brutal consequences for the child who represents the figure of 'the kid most likely'. While their circumstances differ in many ways, each is arbitrarily labelled within school settings by medicalised discourses that position them within the terms of abnormality, deviance and risk. Each is impacted upon by discursive silences that effectively override accepted knowledges about pedagogic practice, professional responsibilities and institutional accountabilities. Such silences simultaneously call into question and establish the limits of these forms of social knowledge that are upheld as necessary for ensuring the wellbeing of children. In particular, these three narratives call for closer examinations of the complicity of individual practices, professional discourses and institutional structures in the production of symbolic and material violence.
In each case, the constitutive force of naming and silencing is reinscribed by the complicity of witnesses who fail to speak or intervene in any meaningful way. At
Westland Preschool, a small child's efforts to fend off the taunts and provocations of others are read as 'worrying' behaviour. Those who observe and respond to his outbursts fail to see the injustices to which he is subjected, thereby collectively reproducing them. In the Plains High staffroom, those least powerful are arbitrarily spoken with a language of derision and contempt, while those best situated to intervene silently chew their sandwiches as though nothing of significance has happened. Meanwhile, in the back of a prison van where he should never have been, a young boy's life is ended in a culmination of naming, silencing and institutional failures that marked his experience of schooling and later, the justice system.
These kinds of practices are everywhere implicated in producing privileged norms of recognition and conduct to which we are all subjected, and in which we are all, I
would suggest, in some ways complicit. For the violence produced in the difference between what is said and what is done in Western societies is a collective, rather than an individual issue, and in the words of Certeau:
I cannot exempt myself from this common situation by flashing my intellectual union card. Violence is not in the first place a matter for reflection, nor is it an object that can be put before the eyes of an observer. It is inscribed in the place from which I speak of it. Violence defines that place (Certeau, 1997, p. 29) .
Acknowledging the complexities through which violence speaks and is spoken in the places where we stand as educators, as researchers, as family and community members, is surely the crucial way forward. I would argue then for an insistent and collective speaking into those spaces of naming and silence that-be they located in the micro practices of schools and classrooms, or performed on the broader stage of national and global politics-produce the kinds of conditions of impossibility that claim the learning, the optimism, and the possible futures of far too many young people. As we endeavour to analyse discursive complicities not for the purposes of apportioning blame, but in order to "obtain a means of discovering what has to be done" (Certeau, 1997, p. 30 ), perhaps we might open up new possibilities for 'the kid most likely' to make it through, to grow up, to join in, to answer back, to speak a new language in which the brutality of naming and silence has no place.
.
